📖 Introduction

The creative economy is booming, but with innovation comes conflict. From filmmakers and architects to music labels and tech platforms, copyright disputes are reshaping the boundaries of authorship, ownership, and enforcement.

2019 was a year that saw Indian courts deliver landmark rulings, clarifying critical aspects of the Copyright Act, 1957. These cases addressed moral rights, statutory licensing, architectural works, film copyrights, and the growing menace of rogue websites.

Why revisit them now? Because these judgments continue to influence how businesses structure agreements, how creators protect their work, and how platforms navigate licensing. Whether you’re a creator, entrepreneur, or legal professional, understanding these cases helps you anticipate challenges in an era where digital content travels faster than laws adapt.

Here’s a closer look at five important cases, starting with one that reaffirmed the moral rights of authors even after assigning their copyright.

1. Sajeev Pillai v. VenuKunnapalli & Anr

Issue

Does an author retain special moral rights to claim authorship under Section 57(1) of the Copyright Act, even after assigning their copyright?

📖 Background

🎬 Sajeev Pillai, a filmmaker and scriptwriter, spent years researching the historic Mamankam festival and developing a script for a movie on the subject. He entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Kavya Film Company, associated with VenuKunnapalli, and was appointed as the director.

However, Pillai was later removed from the project, and the film was completed without his involvement. Pillai alleged that his script had been significantly modified and distorted, compromising his creative vision. He filed a suit seeking an injunction to prevent the release and distribution of the film without proper authorship credit and to restrain further exploitation of the work..

⚖️ Judgment

The Kerala High Court examined Section 57(1) of the Copyright Act, which provides authors with moral rights independent of the economic rights assigned to others. The Court held that:

• Under Section 57(1)(a), an author retains the right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or modification of their work that would harm their honor or reputation.
• Under Section 57(1)(b), the author is entitled to claim damages for such prejudicial acts.

The Court ruled that assigning the copyright does not strip an author of their moral rights. These rights are inherent and cannot be waived or transferred. As a result, Pillai had the legal standing to demand proper authorship credit and challenge modifications that harmed his reputation.

💡 Key Takeaway

Moral rights serve as a powerful safeguard for authors, protecting their reputation even after copyright assignment. Creators should ensure their agreements explicitly address credit attribution and modifications to avoid similar disputes.

📌 Why It Still Matters

In today’s content-driven world, moral rights remain a critical tool for creators to protect their integrity and preserve their legacy—even when they no longer own the copyright.

2. Tips Industries Ltd. v. Wynk Music Ltd.

Issue

Does Section 31D of the Copyright Act, 1957 provide statutory licensing rights to online streaming services like Wynk Music?

📖 Background

This case revolved around the interpretation of Section 31D, introduced through the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012. Section 31D allows “any broadcasting organization” to secure a statutory license to broadcast sound recordings by paying royalties at rates fixed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board.

Tips Industries Ltd., a leading Indian music label, had initially licensed its extensive music catalog to Wynk Music, an online music streaming platform owned by Airtel. When the license expired in 2017, the parties could not agree on the terms for renewal. Wynk continued to provide access to Tips’ music to its users, claiming it was entitled to a statutory license under Section 31D.

Tips challenged Wynk’s stance, arguing that Section 31D applied only to traditional broadcasting organizations, like radio and television, and not to internet-based streaming platforms. It sought an injunction restraining Wynk from using its sound recordings without a fresh license.

⚖️ Judgment

The Bombay High Court examined the scope of Section 31D and analyzed whether internet streaming services fell within the meaning of “broadcasting organization.” The Court observed:

• Statutory Licensing Is Limited to Traditional Broadcasting
  Section 31D was intended for radio and television broadcasters, allowing them to avoid being held hostage in licensing negotiations while still paying reasonable royalties.
• Download Feature Exceeds Broadcasting
  Wynk’s feature enabling users to download music for offline listening amounted to a “sale” rather than broadcasting. This usage was beyond the scope of Section 31D.
• Internet Broadcasting Not Covered
  The Court rejected Wynk’s reliance on a 2016 DPIIT Office Memorandum that interpreted “broadcasting” to include internet streaming. It clarified that such administrative guidelines lack statutory authority and cannot expand the scope of legislative provisions.

The Court ruled in favor of Tips Industries and restrained Wynk from exploiting Tips’ sound recordings without a voluntary license agreement.

💡 Key Takeaway

Section 31D cannot be stretched to cover internet-based streaming platforms. Online services must negotiate licenses with copyright owners and cannot rely on statutory licensing to bypass commercial agreements.

📌 Why It Still Matters

With the explosion of music and video streaming apps, this case remains a cornerstone for rights holders seeking fair compensation and for platforms navigating complex licensing landscapes.

3. Raj Rewal v Union of India &Ors

Issue

Does an architect, as the creator and legal author of a structure, have the right to object to modifications or demolition of their work by the property owner under Section 57 of the Copyright Act?

📖 Background

This case dealt with the intersection of moral rights in architecture and property rights.

Raj Rewal, a renowned architect, and Mahendra Raj, a structural engineer, designed the iconic Hall of Nations at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, in 1972. Celebrated as a masterpiece of modernist architecture, the building became a symbol of India’s post-independence aspirations.

In 2016, the India Trade Promotion Organisation (ITPO), which owned the premises, proposed demolishing the Hall of Nations to make way for an Integrated Exhibition-cum-Convention Centre. Despite efforts by Rewal and heritage conservationists to stop the demolition, the complex was razed.

Rewal filed a suit claiming that demolition violated his moral rights as the author of the work under Section 57 of the Copyright Act, which protects against distortion, mutilation, or modification of a work that prejudices the author’s honor or reputation. He sought a mandatory injunction to reinstate the building according to the original plans.

⚖️ Judgment

The Delhi High Court examined whether moral rights extended to preventing the demolition of a building.

• Property Rights vs. Moral Rights
  The Court emphasized the constitutional right of property owners under Article 300A, which grants them control over their land and buildings. It held that these rights outweigh statutory moral rights under Section 57.
• Destruction ≠ Distortion
  The Court clarified that Section 57 protects authors from distortion or mutilation but does not grant them the right to prevent the complete destruction of a building. Once a structure no longer exists, there is nothing to distort or modify.
• Section 52(1)(x) Consideration
  The Court also referred to Section 52(1)(x), which permits reconstruction of buildings without infringing copyright if the original building has been destroyed.

The Court dismissed Rewal’s suit, holding that the demolition of the Hall of Nations did not infringe his moral rights.

💡 Key Takeaway

While architects enjoy moral rights over their creations, these do not extend to preventing the demolition of buildings. Property owners retain the ultimate right to alter or demolish their property.

📌 Why It Still Matters

As urban redevelopment accelerates, this case underscores the need for stronger heritage protection laws if iconic works of architecture are to be preserved beyond the limits of copyright.

4. YRF v Sri Sai Ganesh Productions

Issue

Does “making a copy of a film” under Section 14 of the Copyright Act include creating an infringing version with substantial similarities?

Does copyright subsist in a cinematographic film independent of its underlying works?

📖 Background

This case addressed copyright protection in cinematographic works and the extent to which unauthorized adaptations constitute infringement.

Yash Raj Films (YRF), a prominent Indian film production company, alleged that Sri Sai Ganesh Productions’ Telugu film Jabardasth was an unauthorized adaptation of YRF’s hit Hindi film Band Baaja Baaraat. YRF claimed that Jabardasth copied the original film’s theme, plot, character sketches, screenplay, and dialogues, amounting to substantial and material similarity.

YRF sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from screening, distributing, or exploiting the infringing film. The defendants contended that while there might be similarities in broad ideas, there was no copying of expression sufficient to constitute infringement.

⚖️ Judgment

The Delhi High Court analyzed the scope of copyright in cinematographic films under the Copyright Act, 1957.

• Cinematographic Films as Independent Works
  The Court affirmed that copyright subsists in a cinematographic film independent of the copyrights in its underlying works (like scripts or music). This means the film as a whole enjoys protection as an original creative work.
• Substantial Similarity Test
  The Court applied the test established in R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films: If the similarities between two works are such that an average viewer would get an unmistakable impression that one is a copy of the other, infringement is established.
• Defendants Found Guilty of Infringement
  The Court held that Jabardasth copied the substance, foundation, and kernel of Band Baaja Baaraat. The similarities were not merely in ideas but in expression, character arcs, and narrative flow, which constituted infringement.

The Court granted an injunction restraining the defendants from further exploiting the infringing film.

💡 Key Takeaway

Copyright in a cinematographic film protects the expression of ideas, not just the underlying works. Substantial similarity in theme, character development, and narrative can amount to infringement.

📌 Why It Still Matters

As content localization and adaptations rise, this case highlights the importance of securing proper adaptation rights to avoid costly litigation and reputational damage.

5. UTV Software Communication Ltd., v.1337X.TO and Ors

Issue

How should courts address “hydra-headed” rogue websites that, when blocked, resurface as mirror, redirect, or alphanumeric websites hosting infringing content?

📖 Background

This case tackled the growing menace of online piracy and the challenges of enforcement in the digital era.

UTV Software Communications Ltd., a leading producer and distributor of cinematographic works, filed a suit against 30 identified rogue websites, numerous John Doe defendants, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the Department of Telecom, and various Internet Service Providers (ISPs).

UTV argued that these websites were dedicated to hosting and providing access to pirated copies of its copyrighted films, causing substantial losses. The identified sites frequently changed their domain names or appeared as mirror sites, making enforcement of court-ordered blocking injunctions ineffective.

The company sought a robust remedy to not only block the current infringing domains but also prevent future iterations of these websites from reappearing under different guises.

⚖️ Judgment

The Delhi High Court recognized the unique challenges posed by rogue websites in the digital space.

• Introduction of Dynamic Injunctions
  The Court adopted a forward-thinking approach by introducing the concept of a “dynamic injunction”—an order that extends automatically to mirror, redirect, or alphanumeric websites that emerge after the original injunction.
• Global Precedents
  The Court relied on international jurisprudence, particularly referencing the Singapore High Court’s ruling in Disney v. M1, where similar dynamic injunctions were implemented to combat online piracy.
• Implementation Mechanism
  The Court allowed UTV to submit additional affidavits identifying new rogue websites falling within the scope of the original injunction. Once verified, ISPs would be directed to block access to these sites without requiring fresh litigation for each new domain.

This landmark decision gave copyright owners an effective tool to address the constantly evolving tactics of online pirates.

💡 Key Takeaway

Dynamic injunctions provide copyright holders with a powerful mechanism to combat piracy by targeting not just specific websites but also their future iterations.

📌 Why It Still Matters

In an age of fast-proliferating digital piracy, dynamic injunctions remain a critical enforcement tool for protecting intellectual property rights without overburdening courts or rights holders.

📢 Closing Thoughts: Protecting Creativity in a Changing World

These five landmark cases from 2019 continue to shape India’s copyright landscape. They remind creators and businesses alike that protecting intellectual property is not just a legal necessity but a strategic advantage.

As technology evolves and content flows across borders, proactive copyright management is key to safeguarding creative legacies. Learn more about Intepat’s Copyright Registration and Advisory Services to protect your creations effectively.

🔒🛡️ Safeguard Your Creative Work Before It’s Too Late

Copyright challenges are evolving faster than ever. Intepat’s experts can help you register your work, monitor infringements, and enforce your rights through strategic advisory and takedown actions.